Complete removal of MEV is impractical within any high-throughput blockchain, so most mitigation efforts are designed to make extraction less damaging. Some approaches attempt to limit exposure by protecting user transactions from strategies that profit through manipulation of ordering or timing. Others focus on reshaping how value is surfaced and captured, channeling MEV into competitive processes that increase transparency and fairness.

A separate line of work considers deeper adjustments to protocol mechanics, changing how transactions are confirmed or how blockspace is allocated in order to reduce opportunities for distortion. Together these directions demonstrate a pragmatic orientation. The aim is to curb the most harmful effects, redirect incentives toward healthier behaviors, and establish safeguards that make the system more predictable.

The strategies that have emerged can be grouped into two broad categories.

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Infra-layer approaches modify how validators participate in block construction and how they interact with off-chain coordination systems. These include mechanisms such as specialized auctions, transaction bundles, or shared sequencing services that attempt to manage extraction through structured processes.

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Application-layer defenses work higher up the stack by redesigning trading venues or incorporating privacy into transaction flow. Examples include automated market maker models that reduce the scope for sandwiching or execution schemes that hide trade details until confirmation. Neither category provides a complete solution, and most come with trade-offs in efficiency, decentralization, or transparency.

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However, taken together they represent an expanding toolkit that gives the ecosystem a way to shape where MEV arises, who captures it, and how its impact is distributed across participants.

Batching to Remove Time-Based Advantage: Batch auctions offer a fundamentally different execution model: rather than processing trades sequentially as they arrive, they aggregate multiple transactions over a fixed time window and execute them simultaneously. This approach eliminates time-based ordering advantages (the root of many MEV strategies) and allows matched trades to settle directly against each other without passing through volatile liquidity pools.

While native batch auctions are rare on Solana today, the model has received growing attention as a mitigation path, particularly from protocol teams designing new execution layers. These auctions mimic the CoWSwap architecture from Ethereum, where a batch coordinator aggregates intent and computes a globally optimal settlement path, including internal matchings and external fills.

Impact of Delayed Execution: By delaying execution and centralizing order resolution, batch auctions reshape how value flows through the network.

Pros:

• Returns MEV to users through surplus redistribution
• Reduces L1 congestion and improves throughput efficiency
• Supports whitehat protection and dynamic execution upgrades
• Minimizes slippage and reverts by removing incentive for front-running

Cons:

• Introduces latency, making it incompatible with some real-time strategies
• Requires significant protocol coordination and integration changes
• May centralize execution power if not transparently governed

While no large-scale implementation of batch auctions exists on Solana yet, several teams are actively exploring the model for stablecoin swaps, RFQ-style aggregators, and NFT minting.

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Jito has become the central infrastructure layer for MEV on Solana, coordinating how value is extracted and redistributed within the network. It operates at validator scale, providing the pipelines through which most blockspace is now managed. Its dominance comes from two foundational components that have been widely adopted by the validator set.

The first is a high-performance block engine used by more than 90% of stake-weighted validators. This system manages block construction in a way that maximizes MEV capture, while also streamlining validator operations. The second is a private RPC relay that routes user transactions directly to participating validators, bypassing the public mempool and creating a privileged channel for order flow. Together, these services have institutionalized MEV on Solana. They formalize extraction processes, enable structured bidding for transaction priority, and offer limited defenses against adversarial ordering.

The BAM UpgradeJito’s most recent upgrade, the Block-Auction Market (BAM), extends this framework by introducing full-block auctions. Instead of submitting discrete bundles, searchers can now bid for ordering rights across entire slots. This consolidates MEV into a highly structured market where validators directly monetize ordering control. While BAM improves efficiency for searchers and creates predictable revenue streams for validators, it further entrenches MEV as a validator-aligned asset rather than a shared public good. The design prioritizes infrastructure profitability over user protection, embedding extraction into the very fabric of block production.

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Jito markets its private RPC endpoint as a safeguard against hostile strategies such as frontrunning and mempool sniping. By avoiding public propagation, transactions face fewer opportunities for interception before reaching a validator. Yet the protection is narrow. Once transactions are inside Jito’s controlled environment, they remain exposed to the same ordering games, only now managed through the validator’s own monetized framework. Users may experience less overt predation, but they do not avoid extraction. Instead, their order flow becomes raw material for auctions from which they see no direct benefit.

Pros

• Deep integration with validator infrastructure and broad adoption across the network
• Structured monetization of MEV that generates stable validator revenue
• Partial shielding of user transactions through private routing

Cons

• Does not eliminate or fundamentally reduce extraction, only redirects it
• Provides no user rebates or compensation from captured MEV
• Concentrates power in a single infrastructure provider, raising centralization concerns

Assessment
Jito has transformed MEV on Solana from a hidden exploit into an explicit market. In doing so, it has reduced chaos for validators and searchers but shifted costs squarely onto users, who continue to be extracted without recourse or compensation. Rather than solving MEV, Jito has operationalized it. The result is a cleaner, more profitable system for infrastructure actors, but one that leaves underlying problems of fairness, decentralization, and user welfare unaddressed. Its dominance makes it difficult for alternative approaches to emerge, reinforcing a system where mitigation is synonymous with monetization.

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